We show that for every cooperative game a corresponding set game can be defined, called the standard set game.
Introduction
The concept set game was introduced by Hoede in [H 92] . A set game is a pair N s , v s , where N s is a nonempty, finite set, called the player set and v s : 2 Ns → 2 Us associates with every coalition S of players a subset of U s , called the value (worth) of coalition S. We assume that v s (∅) = ∅. Set games differ from cooperative games in the fact that the value of a coalition S of N s players is not a real number, but a set taken from a universe U s . A solution ψ on the set of all set games G associates a so-called allocation ψ(N s , v s ) = (ψ i (N s , v s )) i∈Ns ∈ (2 Us ) Ns with every set game N s , v s . For every i ∈ N s , ψ i represents the items that are given , according to the solution ψ, to player i from participating in the game.
Example 1 Let
Several solutions were proposed for set games (see [A94] , [DS01a] , [DS01b] and [SZL99] ). As stated in [DS01b] , these solutions can be included in the class of semi-marginalistic values. A semi-marginalistic value ψ on the set game space G has the following form [DS01a] .
Example 2
The IM solution to the set game introduced in Example 1 is the following
In many situations, there is a cost associated to each element of the universe U s and one is interested in how to share the costs between the players. One method of cost sharing is proposed by Hoede in [H02] . The allocation of the set game determines for each player i, ψ i as a set of elements of U s . If an element u S , S ⊆ N has cost c(u S ), then this cost is to be shared by all players that have u S in their allocation. In the literature people consider cooperative games on the reals, in the sense that the worth of a coalition is a real number, usually chosen from R. Our goal is to show the intimate relationship between cooperative games and set games. This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we show that with every cooperative game (N c , v c ) one can associate a set game N s , v s , using basic units. In Sections 3,4 and 5 we will analyze the relations between several solutions defined for a cooperative game and the solutions defined on the associated standard set game.
The standard set game
Consider a cooperative game (N c , v c ) , where N c is the set of players and v c : 2 Nc → R is a mapping which associates with each coalition S the value of the coalition. We associate with (N c , v c ) the following set game, called the standard set game associated to (N c , v c ). 
One can easily verify that for each S, S ⊂ N s ,
Example 3
Consider the following cooperative game. N c = {1, 2, 3} and
The standard set game associated with (N c , v c ) is defined by
From (1), the costs of the basic units are
Remark
In [A94] and [DS01b] it is proved that for every monotonic set game, i.e., a game for
Clearly, the standard set game N s , v s associated with a cooperative game (
The Shapley value
In this section we will first show two ways of obtaining the Shapley value for a cooperative game (N c , v c ) via the standard set game associated with it.
Let (N, v c ) be a cooperative game and N, v s its associated standard set game. Recall that the Shapley value for (N, v c ) is defined as
An equivalent definition of the Shapley value is
Now consider the solutions IM, OCM and DS for N, v s . From the definition of these solutions (see Section 1) and the definition of a standard set game follows that
Consider for this ψ i the cost sharing method a = (a i ) i∈N defined as described before, leading to
From (1) follows that
Next we will show how, for a restricted class of games, the Shapley value comes forward with the help of the excess vector (complaint vector) . Suppose that I(v c ) = ∅. For every x ∈ I(v c ), the excess vector (complaint vector) θ(x) has as its coordinates the excesses e(S, x) := v c (S) − i∈S x i , for every coalition S, and these excesses are written down in decreasing order. The imputation for which the complaint vector is lexicographically minimal is called the nucleolus.
Using (2) the excesses can be written as
Suppose now that c(u S ) ≥ 0, for all S ⊆ N , and that we are interested in finding an imputation x that keeps all the excesses negative. A natural way is to proceed as follows.
First set
Clearly, e({i}, x) ≤ 0, for every i ∈ N s but for S with |S| ≥ 2 it may happen that e(S, x) > 0. Next we change x such that e(S, x) ≤ 0 for every S ⊆ N, |S| ≤ 2.
Clearly,
satisfies (5). Proceeding in this way, we finally obtain that the imputation
maintains all the excesses non-positive. Obviously, x is exactly the Shapley value for (N, v c ).
We have seen here how one can use the standard set game in order to obtain the Shapley value. It is very difficult to extend the approach in order to obtain the nucleolus. The reason for this is that the analytic minimization involved in calculating the nucleolus is unavoidable and beyond the scope of set games. A similar phenomenon occurs in the next section. 
The τ − value
It is easy to see that such an α exists only if the set game satisfies the following two conditions:
Then, α would be equal to
or, in terms of basic units,
Note that if it exists, the allocation given by the convex combination in (6) is not necessarily equal to the τ -value associated to the cooperative game. The reason for this is that analytical expressions such as maximum and minimum of a function cannot be covered by a set game.
Remark Applying this procedure to the set game in Example 3 we obtain α = First of all remark that if, in the standard set game, c(u S ) ≥ 0 for every S ⊆ N, then the core is nonempty. In Section 3 we already saw that in this case the Shapley value has the property that it makes the excesses non-positive. So it is in the core.
In fact, the nonnegativity of the costs of the basic units implies a stronger statement with respect to (N c , v c ), namely that the game is convex. Recall that (N c , v c ) is convex if
Using (2), the convexity condition above can be rewritten as
It follows immediately that a game for which all basic units have nonnegative costs is convex. Hence, the core is nonempty and the Shapley value is an element of it.
One would like to formulate a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in terms of the costs of the standard set game elements. One way to achieve this is by simply translating the characterization of non-emptiness given by Bondareva [B63] and Shapley [S67] . The conditions are that for each set of values α S , S ⊆ N , for which we have that
Again, we immediately see that this condition is satisfied if c(u S ) ≥ 0, for all S ⊆ N . However, we would like to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions on the c(u S ) only. So far we have not succeeded in this.
Discussion
The axiomatization of values for set games was first studied by Aarts, Funaki and Hoede ([AFH97] and [AFH00] ). The papers of Driessen and Sun ([DS01a] and [DS01b] ) form a continuation of this work.
In first instance it was somewhat unclear how set games compare to cooperative games. By the results given in this paper we now know that set games are intimately related to cooperative games with coalition values in the reals. However, they cover only the combinatorial aspect of normal cooperative games. It was for this reason that direct analogs for the τ -value or the nucleolus could not be found for the standard set game.
Yet the fact that set games may be seen as covering the combinatorial aspect of cooperative games has a certain potential. As was shown in [H02] , Example 1 is the set game that can be defined for the cost sharing problem for three pieces a, b and c, of a landing strip, to be used by players, planes 1, 2 and 3, where 1 uses a, 2 uses a and b and 3 uses a, b and c. The solution given in Example 2 gives the basis for the cost sharing solution by remarking that all the players should pay for a, players 2 and 3 for b and player 3 for c. The actual costs of the basic units a, b and c are left out of consideration. This situation seems to prevail in many cost sharing problems. The players are interested in certain basic units and coalitions can be given a worth equal to the union of these basic units. The set game that is defined this way captures the combinatorial aspects of the cost sharing problem. Further considerations on the actual costs of the basic units may then include the cost sharing based on the set game solution as one of the inputs. This splitting up of cost sharing problems into a set game part and a part in which only costs are further considered will be discussed in another paper.
